Rainier Beach:
A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth

2022 Final Report

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What is Rainier Beach: A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth?
Rainier Beach: A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth (ABSPY) is an innovative community-led, place-based violence prevention initiative. The goal of the program is to reduce youth victimization and crime in the Rainier Beach neighborhood. The program is named for the vision set out by the Rainier Beach community in its Neighborhood Plan Update, which is to make Rainier Beach a Beautiful Safe Place. ABSPY is happening in five small groups of street blocks in the neighborhood—"hot spots"—where about half of all youth crime incidents in Rainier Beach happened in 2012, when planning for the ABSPY initiative began. The five hot spots are Rose Street, Rainier and Henderson, Rainier Beach Light Rail Station, Lake Washington, and Our Safe Way. This 2022 report updates our original 2016 evaluation report and annual updates from 2017 through 2021.

ABSPY Background
ABSPY is based on a number of research studies, including one from Seattle by David Weisburd and his colleagues, showing that about half of all crime in cities comes from a very small number—typically about 5 percent—of street blocks. Crime involving young people is even more likely to come from a small number of places. Research shows that police efforts to reduce crime at hot spots through crackdowns and arrests are effective at reducing crime, but arrest and prosecution can increase the chance of reoffending among high-risk youth. ABSPY focuses on **non-arrest** strategies to reduce crime, such as building community leadership and capacity to help solve problems and addressing environmental risk factors for crime to promote community safety. ABSPY was originally funded by a $1 million grant from the Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation Program, an initiative of the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance, awarded in 2012, and has been funded by the City of Seattle since 2016. ABSPY is advised by a Core Team including representatives from the City of Seattle, the Seattle Neighborhood Group, the Boys and Girls Club of King County, Seattle Public Schools, and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition. However, what makes ABSPY unique is that community members in Rainier Beach itself took the lead in developing evidence-informed strategies to address the root causes of youth crime in the neighborhood.

Community-Led Problem Solving
From 2013 through 2016, in an effort overseen by the Core Team, community members from the five Rainier Beach hot spots took the lead in developing evidence-informed strategies to address the root causes of youth crime in the neighborhood. These interventions were tailored to the specific conditions in each hot spot, and continue to be regularly updated and adjusted based on new data and changing conditions in the hot spots. ABSPY's signature interventions include:

- **Corner Greeter** events, led by the Rainier Beach Action Coalition, in which young people from the neighborhood set up stations offering refreshments, information, and fun activities in each hot spot to engage community members and "activate" places that were previously considered to be unsafe.

- **Safe Passage**, led by the Boys and Girls Club of King County, which provides guardianship, supervision, and encouragement to young people as they leave school. Since 2020, the Boys and Girls Club has also led community healing spaces in the hot spots.

- **Business engagement**, coordinated by Seattle Neighborhood Group and local community and economic development organizations. This intervention focuses on learning about the concerns facing local businesses, building relationships between businesses, and increasing business owners' ability to prevent and report crime.

- **Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)** interventions and resources, applied to both public and private property, to improve design, layout, and place management.

- **Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS) and restorative practices** in both school and community settings, overseen by Seattle Public Schools and the ABSPY Core Team, to collaboratively set behavioral expectations for young people, reward good behavior, support youth in need of services, and engage in supportive conflict resolution and healing circles.

Updated Evaluation Findings

The Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy at George Mason University is the research partner for ABSPY. For this report, we tracked calls for service and reported crime in the five hot spots from January 2011 to December 2022. We paired each Rainier Beach hot spot with a comparison hot spot—a similar location elsewhere in Seattle Police Department's South Precinct—and assessed crime rates in the Rainier Beach hot spots and neighborhood compared to trends in the South Precinct. We also conducted an online survey with community members in the five ABSPY hot spots, which was distributed via the mailing lists of ABSPY partners, including RBAC, the Boys and Girls Club, and SNG; social media; and flyers with QR codes posted in the five sites. The survey asked questions about community members' perceptions of public safety and community resources.

Our updated findings for 2022 show that **crime in the ABSPY hot spots began trending upwards**, after decreasing for the past few years, and community members have some concerns about crime and policing in the neighborhood, but **crime involving young people remains very low.**

- There was an uptick in crime in 2022, but youth offenses remain low. Crime increased in all of the hot spots except Safeway this year, but the majority of the increase was driven by crimes involving adults.

- PBIS and business improvements are associated with lower rates of some offense types, even though they are higher in the hot spots overall. Our statistical models showed that even though some offense types, like violent offenses, were higher in the hot spots despite ABSPY, these offenses were significantly *lower* during the months when these interventions were active.

- Community members generally think ABSPY makes Rainier Beach safer. Fewer survey respondents were familiar with the ABSPY interventions compared to last year, but those who were viewed them favorably.

- Most people think crime has at least stayed the same, if not gotten better, in Rainier Beach in the past year, but there are concerns about serious crime.

- Community members report moderate levels of social cohesion and collective efficacy. While the numbers were a little lower than in previous years, people in the hot spots generally believe their neighbors care about the community and are willing to intervene in certain situations.

- Perceptions of police were less favorable than in previous years. Community members report that they rarely see the police, and only around a quarter believed that the police do a good job preventing crime. Just over one-third believed that the police treat people fairly and with respect.

Recommendations for 2023

Based on our analyses and participation in Core Team activities this year, we recommend the following focus areas for 2023:

- Develop a **concrete action plan for ABSPY sustainability and development**, including raising ABSPY's local and national profile; exploring new sources of financial support; and discussing the role of ABSPY in broader community safety initiatives.

- Continue exploring how to **re-engage the community and increase representation, particularly among youth**, in the continued development and evolution of ABSPY interventions and data collection and evaluation efforts.

- **Explore and rethink options for data collection and analysis**, as the opportunity to hire a new local research partner opens up more options for a variety of outcome measures and data collection techniques.

- **Re-engage with Lake Washington Apartments** to address the reduced collaboration at this site in 2022 and the increase in crime involving adults.

- **Consider whether to re-engage the Seattle Police Department** given a lack of participation and Core Team and community concerns.

1 Background

This report updates the original *Rainier Beach: A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth* (ABSPY) Final Evaluation Report (Gill et al., 2016) and subsequent evaluation updates (Gill & Prince, 2020a, 2020b, 2021; Gill & Vitter, 2017; Gill et al., 2018) with new findings from our crime analysis and community survey in 2022. ABSPY is a **community-led, place-based, data-driven, non-arrest based collaboration** focused on preventing crime in five juvenile and youth crime hot spots in the Rainier Beach neighborhood of Seattle (see Figure 1). ABSPY builds on several neighborhood and City processes, including the 2011 Rainier Beach Neighborhood Plan Update (RBNPU) and the Seattle Youth Violence Prevention Initiative, and is grounded in research evidence showing that crime—especially crime involving juveniles and youth[1]—is highly concentrated at small places (e.g. Weisburd, 2015; Weisburd et al., 2004, 2009). This evidence indicates that policing and crime prevention efforts focused at these hot spots are effective (Braga et al., 2014; Lum et al., 2011; Weisburd & Majmundar, 2018). However, proactive policing approaches that focus on law enforcement strategies such as crackdowns and "busts" to clear offenders from high-crime areas may not be suitable at hot spots of youth crime, since young people who are arrested and processed through the juvenile justice system—especially those involved in less serious crimes—are more likely to reoffend than those who are diverted. Research suggests that community-led, non-arrest strategies may be more appropriate at such places.

Figure 1: Rainier Beach hot spots identified for ABSPY intervention

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
[1]ABSPY defines "youth" as individuals aged 25 and under. While the juvenile justice system focuses on young people under the age of 18, ABSPY builds on increasing recognition by researchers and policy makers that the brain does not fully develop until around age 25, directly impacting decision-making and risky behavior (e.g. Steinberg, 2008).

The RBNPU explicitly called for a community-led hot spots approach to address crime and improve neighborhood safety in Rainier Beach, which led to the development of ABSPY. The planning process began in 2012 with the development of a successful $1 million grant proposal to the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance's Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation Program. Implementation began in October 2013 with a problem-solving process undertaken by Community Task Force (CTF) teams representing each of the five hot spots, and the subsequent development and implementation of a suite of signature interventions (see below). Federal funding continued through September 2016. Beginning in January 2016, the City of Seattle also began to fund implementation and evaluation on an annual basis. ABSPY funding was overseen by the Human Services Department from 2016 to 2020, and transferred to the Department of Neighborhoods in 2021. ABSPY planning and implementation is overseen by a cross-sector Core Team and supported by a range of community intervention partners. A detailed description of ABSPY's history, including key partners, hot spot identification process, problem-solving process, and intervention development, can be found in the original evaluation report (Gill et al., 2016).

2 2022 Intervention Update

Our 2017 evaluation update shows the timeline of ABSPY interventions from October 2013, the beginning of the planning phase, to October 2017 (Gill & Vitter, 2017, p. 3). The interventions continued through the last few months of 2017 and were consistently implemented through 2018 and 2019. When the COVID-19 pandemic began in early 2020, some ABSPY interventions were temporarily paused, while others continued in a modified capacity (for example, virtual Peace Circles), and new initiatives started up to respond to the immediate effects of the pandemic and other challenges that arose during 2020. For example, Core Team members have coordinated community healing spaces to respond to local and national events and helped provide information to residents about access to COVID testing, food support, and so on. Some of these newer interventions, such as the community healing spaces, have continued along with the original ABSPY activities as in-person events began to return during 2022. The ABSPY Core Team continued to meet virtually in 2022 to coordinate the program.

2.1 Intervention summary

2.1.1 Coordination and planning

In 2022 the Core Team continued to focus on the future of the initiative; in particular, what it means for ABSPY to grow. The team discussed how to raise the profile of the initiative at the local level; strategies for sustaining the work following the conclusion of the NIJ Comprehensive School Safety Initiative grant at the end of 2022; the role of the Seattle Police Department (SPD) in ABSPY; and how to more meaningfully include youth in ABSPY efforts.

- **Funding and sustainability.** Discussions took place at Core Team meetings throughout the year about what it means for ABSPY to grow, building on themes discussed in 2021 about whether ABSPY is a process or a set of specific interventions, who owns the idea, and whether and how it could be replicated in other places. There remains a feeling that ABSPY cannot simply be 'ported' to other locations, but there is also a recognition of the importance of growing the profile of the initiative both locally and nationally, which may lead to consulting opportunities. The opportunity to bring a

new research partner onto the team in 2023 also opened up a conversation about what the goals of ABSPY are, and whether crime should continue to be a focus or whether public health, community engagement, and/or economic development outcomes are becoming more salient.

Given the funding changes in 2022, Core Team members also sought new opportunities to support aspects of ABSPY's work. RBAC received funding from the City of Seattle's Human Services Department (HSD) to expand its work on youth neighborhood engagement, and SNG and the Boys and Girls Club received a significant grant from King County's Best Starts for Kids. Both of these funding opportunities allow the team to continue some of the successful initiatives developed with NIJ funds, including the peace circles and neighborhood safety planning.

- **Community advocacy and outreach.** In 2022 Core Team members discussed how to improve advocacy and outreach within the city, including reaching out to the Mayor's office and inviting local representatives to meetings. While no guest visits were scheduled in 2022, the goal was to showcase what ABSPY is and the work done. In general there is a desire among Core Team members to get more politically involved, which also relates to questions about sustainability. The team also discussed whether and how to re-engage with SPD, and there was disagreement about whether this should be a priority goal given previous challenges with SPD representation.

2.1.2 Safe Passage

Safe Passage is one of the flagship initiatives of ABSPY. Overseen by the Boys and Girls Club of King County, Safe Passage provides supervision, guardianship, and a friendly face on the streets in the afternoons (between 1 and 6pm) when children are leaving schools on the Rainier and Henderson campus and the risk of youth crime at this hot spot is highest. Safe Passage staff work for the Boys and Girls Club and are community members who have grown up in the neighborhood. They are easily recognizable by their bright blue jackets or t-shirts with the "Be Safe" slogan, which (along with "Be Safe Bro!") has become a popular greeting between the Safe Passage team and local young people. While Safe Passage staff are authorized to break up fights, they primarily focus on providing a positive presence and engaging young people as they walk home or head to the bus stop. During the pandemic, the team also increased its focus on case management and supporting vulnerable families by delivering food and school supplies and supporting Boys and Girls Club activities to keep children safe and occupied while schools were closed. In 2022 the team continued these activities and also expanded the safety routes throughout the school campuses and ABSPY hot spots.

2.1.3 Corner Greeters

The Corner Greeters initiative, overseen by the Rainier Beach Action Coalition (RBAC), consists of positive community messaging, mobilization, and outreach; pop-up events and activities such as music, food, dancing, crafts, and other fun and culturally-relevant activities at the hot spots; and community data collection. The goal of the Corner Greeters is to "take back" hot spot spaces for the community and build collective efficacy and empowerment among residents. The key feature of the Corner Greeters is that the events are completely youth-led. Young people from the neighborhood collaborate with RBAC to plan different activities and staff the events. They are also trained to communicate and share ABSPY data and information, such as neighborhood crime data reports, with visitors to their events to connect

community members to ABSPY, build collective efficacy, and empower them to take action in the neighborhood. RBAC is also responsible for the Mobile Discovery Center, a unique community information booth on wheels that sets up at Corner Greeter and other neighborhood events. The Corner Greeters also conduct their own surveys regularly at the Rainier Beach hot spots to track community perceptions of safety and collective efficacy at the hot spots, and support ABSPY at community events. Finally, the Corner Greeters are involved in community clean-up projects around the ABSPY service area. The program was able to expand this year thanks to the funding to RBAC from HSD, which provided support to bring on new Corner Greeters and provide more coordination and activities.

2.1.4 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) and business engagement

While some of ABSPY's CPTED and business engagement funds were reallocated in 2022 to support Rainier Beach United and the community healing spaces, activities in these areas continued RBAC worked with The Mission Continues and local youth and families to make over the Rose Street Triangle, and the Clean Crew conducted clean-up activities at Mapes Creek. RBAC also provided a CPTED orientation for a new tiny home village that was installed near the Light Rail. There were discussions within the Core Team about whether to invite the Seattle Department of Transportation (SDOT) to participate in ABSPY, given their ownership of land and utilities within the hot spot areas.

2.1.5 Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS) and restorative practices

The work supported by the NIJ Comprehensive School Safety Initiative grant continued through the end of 2022 thanks to a further grant extension to account for initial delays in implementation and the effects of the pandemic. RBAC continued to hold PBIS Deep Dives and provide individual safety assessments to businesses throughout the neighborhood. The Boys and Girls Club continued to hold peace circles and community healing spaces, with the latter taking place weekly at the Safeway parking lot.

3 2022 Evaluation Update: Summary of Methods

A detailed description of the data and methods used for this evaluation can be found in the original evaluation report and the 2017 update. This 2022 evaluation is based on monthly police data on calls for service and recorded offenses and incidents from January 2011 to December 2022, provided by SPD, and an online survey of Rainier Beach community members conducted online in December 2021. For our analysis of police data, we matched each Rainier Beach hot spot with a comparison location elsewhere in SPD's South Precinct, which is similar in terms of crime rates and characteristics such as land use, presence of schools, access to public transit etc. These sites were selected in 2012 as part of the original federally-funded evaluation of ABSPY, and further details about the selection process and data are available in our original report. As we have noted in prior reports, we continue to include the originally selected comparison sites because analytic models need to match the research design, but significant gentrification and population change in Southeast Seattle have affected the comparability of these locations since they were first identified. We also now know that the events of 2020, including the COVID-19 pandemic, racial justice protests, and disruptions to police services, had a considerable impact on crime and calls to the police. This also presents challenges for comparing 2020-22 data to previous years. Finally, note that we

were able to include full data through the end of 2022 in this report, rather than ending our analysis in August of the most recent year, thanks to an extension to the research partner funding through March 2023 that allowed us to analyze all the data.

To make this report easier to read, all of the tables and most graphs are included in the Statistical Appendix at the end of this report. You can look at any of the tables or graphs in more detail in the electronic version of this report by clicking on the blue number next to each reference to a table or figure (e.g. Table A1—click the blue "A1" link to see the table).

3.1 Police crime data definitions

We use the following information from official police data provided to us by SPD in our analyses. Each measure of crime data can tell us different information about how ABSPY is working. Note that we are not allowed to report the numbers of certain offense types, including homicide, rape, and domestic incidents. These offenses are included in our statistical analysis because specific numbers cannot be identified from these models, but they are not included when we report the numbers of certain offenses.

1. **Calls for police service.** "Calls for service" include both 911 calls from the public to the police, and the logs that police record (usually on their in-car computers or by calling dispatch) while they are out on patrol. Calls for service tell us what people in the neighborhood are concerned about, what they are willing to call the police about (which may indicate how much they trust the police), and what the police see or hear about while they are in the neighborhood. But calls for service don't tell us the "true" picture of crime. Sometimes the person calling 911 doesn't know exactly what they are seeing or hearing, but when the police arrive they can determine what type of crime has been committed and record this in their report (see below). Multiple people might call 911 about the same problem, like hearing shots being fired. And sometimes, even if a person was worried about an issue and called the police, it might turn out that no crime has been committed or the police can't find whatever was going on. Calls for service also don't tell us who was involved in a crime (e.g. the age, gender, or race of a suspect or victim). This information is verified by police at the scene and included in the report.

2. **Police reports (offenses).** Police write reports when they respond to a call or see something while on patrol and have reason to believe that a crime may have occurred (such as a victim or witness willing to make a report). Although not every call for service turns into a report, the reports give us a better idea of what happened and who was involved. However, police can decide whether or not to take a report, and sometimes victims don't want the police to take a formal report, so not all crimes make it into the data.

   Seattle Police Department, like most other police departments around the country, uses a computerized database to store details about offenses that are reported. Police departments report this information to the FBI via a reporting system called NIBRS (National Incident-Based Reporting System) so that national crime statistics can be compiled.

   This overall category of police reports includes the youth, violent, and minor crime incidents described in points 3-5 below.

3. **Youth crime reports.** Because ABSPY is focused on creating a "beautiful safe place for youth," we

also analyze reports of offenses that involve young people (under 18 and age 18-25) as suspects and/or victims.

4. **Violent crime reports.** ABSPY is also focused on violence prevention, so we look at the effects of the interventions on violent offenses. We define "violent offenses" as murder and non-negligent manslaughter; aggravated assault; robbery; rape; and simple assault.[2]

5. **Group A person offenses.** Offenses reported to NIBRS are classified into Group A and Group B offenses. Group A offenses are the most serious or violent crimes, and are divided into two groups: crimes against people and crimes against property (see point 6 below). Group A person offenses include the violent incident types described in point 4 above, and certain other offenses against the person such as intimidation and kidnapping. To create this category, we selected all offenses that were categorized in SPD's database as both Group A and Person Offenses. A full list of NIBRS offense definitions is available here.

6. **Group A property offenses.** Similar to the Group A person offense category, Group A property offenses include the more serious property offenses. These include crimes like arson, burglary, larceny/theft (including motor vehicle theft), property damage, and so on. To create this category, we selected all offenses that were categorized as both Group A and Property Offenses in SPD's database.

7. **Group B offenses.** NIBRS Group B offenses are typically minor crimes, including things like disorderly conduct, drunkenness, non-violent family offenses, and liquor law violations. It is useful to look at these less serious crimes because they reflect quality of life issues that, while less serious, are still likely to be very important to community members' feelings of safety and confidence in the police.

3.2 Community survey

From 2014 to 2019 we conducted in-person community surveys in the five Rainier Beach and five comparison hot spots. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, we have suspended in-person data collection, but developed a similar online survey instrument for the Rainier Beach community only. The comparison hot spots are outside Rainier Beach and not all in the same neighborhood, so we do not have any way to obtain online access to residents of those areas. In 2020 we distributed the survey to Rainier Beach residents via RBAC's mailing list (approximately 800 members) but only received 19 valid responses. In 2021 we again distributed the survey to RBAC's mailing list, but also shared the link with the Boys and Girls Club, SNG, and the Department of Neighborhoods. This resulted in a much larger response rate: 81 people fully completed the survey. We took several steps to try to increase the response rate further in 2022. First, in addition to sharing the link with the mailing lists of the various partners, we also collaborated with Stew Bowerman of RBAC to ensure posters with QR codes were placed around the hot spot locations so that people who used those spaces but were not on the email lists could participate. We also posted the links on local Nextdoor and Facebook groups. We had the surveys and posters translated into Amharic, Oromo, Somali, Spanish, Vietnamese, and Traditional Chinese to increase participation among speakers/readers of those languages. Finally, we increased participation incentives so that the first 100 participants would receive a $15 Amazon gift card. Unfortunately, about a week and a half into survey implementation after the links were shared on social media, the research partner was

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[2]We are not permitted to report homicide (murder/manslaughter) and rape offenses separately.

anonymously notified that the survey link had been compromised by "bots" in an effort to receive the gift cards. We found that over 3,000 survey responses had been submitted within the space of a few hours from IP addresses around the United States and internationally. Unfortunately, we decided to cut off the survey responses from the time at which the first suspicious entry came in and shut down data collection. Nonetheless, we received 89 valid responses, which was slightly higher than 2021. The survey included questions about residents' perceptions of safety and their assessment of the likelihood of different types of crime and disorder occurring at the hot spot; their knowledge of ABSPY interventions; their perceptions of social cohesion, community involvement, and collective efficacy; their perceptions of and experiences with the police; and demographic questions.

As we cautioned in the 2020 report, it is likely that people who responded to the online survey are different from those we usually encounter on the street. While we were able to capture more participation at the street level this year thanks to the posters, other participants would have heard about the survey via the mailing lists of local community organizations and may be more engaged and aware of ABSPY activities and public safety issues within the community. The characteristics of this year's survey respondents were similar to online survey respondents from 2020 and 2021, and slightly different from the in-person respondents from prior years. The majority (64%) of respondents identified as female, and this year's respondents were a little older than last year, with around 40% in the 18-35 age group. There was more racial and ethnic diversity in this year's group of respondents compared to last year. Twenty-eight percent were White, compared with around half last year. Twenty-one percent identified as Black or African-American, and 19% identified as Asian. A majority (72%) of respondents were born in the United States, which is a little less than last year (89%). Just under half of respodnents (47%) had children of any age. The percentage of respondents who had completed a bachelor's or associate's degree was much higher than last year, at 35%, and 26% reported having completed a masters, graduate, or professional degree. Similar to last year, 42% of respondents listed Rainier and Henderson as the hot spot location where they spent the most time. Twenty-five percent spent most time at Our Safe Way, 13% at the Light Rail, 10% at Lake Washington Apartments, and 9% at Rose Street. Respondents engaged in a variety of activities at their listed location; 57% said that they lived there.

3.3 Analytic strategy

We used the same analytic strategy for the crime data as previous years (see the 2020 Evaluation Update for full details). These statistical models analyze the effects of ABSPY and its specific interventions on police reports and calls for service using random effects negative binomial regression models that also control for autocorrelation between monthly crime rates as well as seasonal and overall crime rates. The updated timeframe for the police data analysis is January 2011 to December 2022 (144 months).[3] We also present descriptive graphs showing the number of reported offenses in each hot spot and across all five Rainier Beach hot spots from January 2011 to December 2022, and the percentage change in each crime outcome pre- and post-May 2014 (when the first interventions were rolled out) in each hot spot relative to its comparison site, the overall Rainier Beach neighborhood, and the South Precinct overall. These descriptive graphs complement the statistical analysis and are easier to read and interpret. However, we caution that, because we were able to use the full year of data for 2022, the descriptive graphs for each hot spot are not comparable to prior years because we now display calendar years instead of partial years from September to August. For the survey, we present a narrative report and descriptive graphs to illustrate the results. We did not conduct any formal statistical analysis of the survey, as there is no

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[3] Refer to the 2017 Evaluation Update for a table showing pre-intervention monthly average numbers for each crime outcome.

comparison group and we have used different methods each year to gather responses, so the results may not be comparable to past years.

4 Updated Evaluation Findings

4.1 There was an uptick in crime in 2022, but youth offenses remain low

Figure 2 shows that, after a relatively steady decline in crime since ABSPY began, there was a slight uptick in offenses involving both adults and youth in the give hot spots combined. However, offenses involving youth in particular remain considerably lower than pre-ABSPY levels. It is possible that, as young people returned to school in late 2021 after the pandemic-related closures, crimes may be returning to slightly higher levels as people are out more frequently in the community. In fact the number of offenses involving youth in 2022 is exactly the same as the number in 2019 (73 offenses in total).

Figure 2: Reported offenses in all Rainier Beach hot spots, 2011-2022

A descriptive analysis of the period pre- and post-May 2014, when ABSPY interventions first began, shows that the numbers of calls for service and reported offenses are still lower in the hot spots since ABSPY began, although they have also been lower in the comparison spots, Rainier Beach as a whole, and the South Precinct (Figures A1-A2). Figure A3 shows that offenses involving youth in the hot spots have decreased slightly more than the comparison spots, the rest of Rainier Beach, and the rest of the South Precinct. Youth offenses were 36% lower in the hot spots, which is a larger decrease than last year's report (-32%). Consisten with last year, violent offenses are 14% lower in the hot spots compared to 8% lower in the South Precinct (Figure A4), and the hot spots also saw the largest decrease in Group A person offenses (9% compared to a 3% decrease in the comparison spots, 1% decrease in the rest of Rainier Beach, and 3% decrease in the South Precinct: FigureA5). Group B offenses were also 12% lower than the pre-ABSPY period in the hot spots, the second year in a row in which they have been lower instead of higher (Figure

A7).

There was an uptick in crime at Rose Street between 2021 and 2022, consistent with the trend in the hot spots overall (Figure 3). This reflects some variability over the past few years at this location. However, the uptick is much more pronounced for adults than youth. There were 35 offenses involving adults, compared to 18 last year, which is still lower than some of the earlier peaks at Rose Street. Offenses involving youth increased from 4 in 2021 to 7 in 2022, which remains lower than pre-ABSPY levels. Despite this uptick, calls for service at Rose Street are 29% lower than in the pre-ABSPY period and offenses are 34% lower (although there have been larger corresponding reductions at Rose Street's comparison site; Figures A8-A9). However, youth offenses are 54% lower since ABSPY began, compared to a 36% reduction in the comparison site (Figure A10). Group A person offenses and Group B offenses are also lower at Rose Street relative to the comparison site (Figures A12 and A14). As with calls for service and offenses, violent offenses and Group A property offenses were all lower post-ABSPY, but there were larger reductions in the comparison sites (Figures A11 and A13).

Figure 3: Reported offenses at Rose Street, 2011-2022

Crime at Rainier and Henderson continues to vary over the years, but in 2022 there was an uptick in both youth and adult offenses (Figure 4). For adults, this was the second year in a row that crime increased, although it is still below its peak right before ABSPY started. Youth crimes more than doubled from 16 in 2021 to 35 in 2022, although it is important to note that the number of crimes in 2021 was the lowest in a single year across the entire project period. Looking at the percentage change pre- and post-ABSPY, calls for service were 24% lower at Rainier and Henderson post-ABSPY and 14% lower at the comparison site (Figure A15). Reported offenses were 10% lower, compared to just 5% lower in the comparison site (Figure A16). We also see this trend for most other crime types: violent offenses are 25% lower at Rainier and Henderson compared to 2% lower in the comparison site (Figure A18); while Group A person offenses and Group B offenses have increased in the comparison site but decreased at Rainier and Henderson (Figures A19, A21). Youth offenses and Part A property are also lower, although they have decreased more in the comparison site (Figures A17, A20).

Figure 4: Offenses and incidents at Rainier & Henderson, 2011-2022

There was also an uptick in crime at the Light Rail, although only for crime involving adults, which increased from 4 incidents in 2021 to 11 in 2022 (Figure 5). However, youth crime remains very low and continues to hold relatively steady. There were only 5 incidents in 2021, and 4 in 2022. Post-ABSPY implementation, the percentage changes in all call and incident types have been greater at the Light Rail than its comparison site (Figures A22-A28). Calls for service have increased by 13% at the Light Rail's comparison site, but *decreased* by 38% at the Light Rail itself (Figure A22). Similarly, Group A person offenses increased by 15% at the comparison site and decreased by 34% at the Light Rail (Figure A26).

Lake Washington also had a substantial uptick in offenses involving adults in 2022 (Figure 6). In 2021 there were 5 more offenses than in 2020, but in 2022 there were an additional 30 offenses—66 in total. For adults, this is the highest number of offenses reported in a year at Lake Washington since 2013, and reflects a change in trends, as crime at this site has been steadily decreasing since 2016. Nonetheless, crimes involving youth remain low and stable. There were 14 offenses per year involving youth every year from 2020 to 2022, which is the lowest number recorded since the beginning of the data collection period in 2011. Despite the uptick in offenses, we still see percentage decreases in most call or offense types at Lake Washington post-ABSPY implementation (Figures A29-A35). While the changes are larger in the comparison sites, calls for service, all offenses, youth offenses, and NIBRS group A and B offenses, are all lower. In fact, youth offenses are 40% lower at Lake Washington than the pre-ABSPY period, although they are 82% lower at the comparison site (Figure A31). Violent offenses were 4% higher at Lake Washington, which is a decrease from most earlier years but compared to a 64% decrease at the comparison site (Figure A32).

Safeway is the only hot spot where there was no overall increase in crime in 2022, despite having been one of the more challenging sites earlier in the ABSPY initiative (Figure 7). There were 41 crimes involving adults in 2022, compared to 53 in 2021—this is the lowest number of adult-involved offenses at this site in the entire project period. However, there was a small increase in the number of youth offenses, from 8 in 2021 to 13 in 2022. However, the number of youth crimes remains very low at Safeway. Calls for

Figure 5: Offenses and incidents at Light Rail, 2011-2022

Figure 6: Offenses and incidents at Lake Washington, 2011-2022

service and most of the offense types remain higher at Safeway post- vs. pre-ABSPY, and are generally higher at the hot spot relative to the comparison site, although the comparison site has also experienced increases (Figures A36-A42). For example, calls for service are 58% higher at Safeway and 22% higher at its comparison site (Figure A36). Violent offenses are 74% higher, compared to 44% higher in the comparison site (Figure A39), and Group A person offenses are 135% higher, compared to 39% higher in the comparison site (Figure A40). However, Group A property offenses were 8% lower at Safeway (11% lower

in the comparison site; Figure A41), and, in a continued indication of success for reducing crime involving young people, youth offenses are 44% lower at Safeway since ABSPY began, compared to 30% lower in the comparison site (Figure A38).

Figure 7: Offenses and incidents at Safeway, 2011-2022

4.2 PBIS and business improvements are associated with lower rates of some offense types, even though they are higher in the hot spots overall

In the previous section we discussed the descriptive results of the evaluation. In this section we use the statistical models described earlier in the report to assess whether the changes in crime we see in the descriptive results are statistically significant; i.e. can we say ABSPY led to the differences, or did they just happen by chance? It's important to understand the limitations of the statistical analysis before we look at the results. As we have noted before, our comparison sites are not randomly assigned it was extremely difficult to find comparison hot spots that were similar to Rainier Beach, especially because many other areas in the South Precinct are experiencing gentrification and economic development that can affect crime rates and people's perceptions of safety. Our statistical results also do not take into account the possibility that a program like ABSPY, which is intended to increase community members' involvement with crime prevention and encourage them to look out for each other and interact more with the police, could increase calls for service, which in turn may lead to higher rates of recorded offenses as the police respond to and take reports for more calls. Finally, the pandemic, protests, and policing challenges in 2020 and 2021 have undoubtedly affected crime rates, making long-term pre-post ABSPY comparisons difficult. These issues may also have affected our hot spots and comparison areas differently.

However, in this year's report, we have included control variables to take into account the effects of the pandemic and school closures. The "pandemic active" variable distinguishes between pre- and post-pandemic. We count March 2020 as the first month in which the pandemic was active. Since this is a pre-post variable, all subsequent months through December 2022 are coded as "pandemic active." The

school closure variable distinguishes all months in which most students were learning remotely in Seattle Public Schools; i.e. December 2020 through August 2021. The inclusion of these variables in the model allow us to account for the effects of the pandemic and school closures on crime rates to better assess whether any changes can be attributed to ABSPY.

Figure A43 shows that calls for service in both the treatment and comparison spots remain fairly steady after a substantial spike in 2021. While the 2021 spike was driven primarily by the comparison sites rather than the treatment sites, in 2022 calls were generally higher in the treatment sites again, as they have been for most of the data collection period. Figure A44 shows the predicted number of calls pre- and post-ABSPY based on our statistical model. It shows that the number of calls has remained relatively steady in the treatment sites pre- and post-ABSPY, but they have decreased slightly in the comparison sites. Table A1 shows the full results of the statistical model for calls for service. For the first time, the interaction term for the post-ABSPY period x ABSPY sites, which tells us about the effect of the program on calls for service, was not statistically significant in the ABSPY-only model, although calls were 6% higher in the treatment sites relative to the comparison sites. However, when we control for the effects of the individual interventions in the full model, calls were 21% higher in the treatment sites in the post-ABSPY period. None of the individual interventions had a significant effect on calls, although all except business improvements were associated with reduced calls for service. Note that the pandemic and school closures did not have any effect on calls for service, all else being equal.

Similarly, the rate of offenses was 23% higher in Rainier Beach in the post-ABSPY period (Figures A45 and A46); youth offenses were 26% higher (Figures A47 and A48); and violent offenses were also 27% higher overall (Figures A49 and A50). However, none of these models was statistically significant (Tables A2-A4). However, there are some interesting findings for the effects of specific ABSPY interventions. During the months when the business improvements were active, Rainier Beach hot spots had a significant 31% lower rate of all offenses relative to the comparison sites. Business improvements were also associated with a significant 68% lower rate of youth offenses and a 51% lower rate of violent offenses. However, the months where Corner Greeters were active are associated with a significant 82% higher rate of youth offenses. PBIS was associated with a significant 49% lower rate of violent offenses. Most of the other interventions were associated with lower rates of these crime types, but not significantly so. It is also notable that COVID-19-related school closures were associated with significantly lower rates of offenses involving youth.

The post-ABSPY period is associated with no change in Group A person offenses, a 30% higher rate of Group A property offenses, and a 20% higher rate of Group B offenses. None of these differences is statistically significant (Tables A5-A7; Figures A51-A56). Business improvements were associated with a significant 30% lower rate of Group A property offenses, and PBIS was associated with a 50% lower rate of Group B offenses. In general, CPTED and Corner Greeters were associated with non-significant higher rates of each of these crime types, while the other interventions were associated with non-significant lower rates of crime.

4.3 Community members generally think ABSPY makes Rainier Beach safer

Moving to the survey findings, fewer respondents this year said that they had noticed the various ABSPY interventions. This may reflect the fact that the survey reached a more diverse population this year, whereas last year it was distributed via mailing lists of organizations that were involved in ABSPY. Just under half (N=42, 47%) of respondents had noticed ABSPY in general. The most well-recognized indi-

vidual intervention was the Be[3], consistent with last year. Fifty-four percent of respondents said they had noticed this intervention, perhaps due to the Be[3] mural that was painted in the neighborhood in 2021. Among the other interventions, equal numbers of respondents (N=39, 44%) had noticed the Corner Greeters, business improvements, and the community healing spaces. Slightly fewer had noticed the Safe Passage team (N=31, 35%).

Most respondents who had noticed the interventions believed that the interventions made the community a little, if not much, safer (Figure 8). About half of all survey respondents felt that each intervention and ABSPY overall made the community safer. Overall these results were slightly less strong than last year's survey, again reflecting the more diverse sample, but are still generally promising. Very few respondents felt that the interventions made the community less safe.

Figure 8: Survey respondents' satisfaction with ABSPY and specific interventions

4.4 Most people think crime has at least stayed the same, if not gotten better, in Rainier Beach in the past year, but there are concerns about serious crime

There was more variability this year in responses to the question "has crime gotten better or worse in the past year" in the hot spots (Figure 9). Last year a majority (57%) of respondents felt crime had gotten somewhat or much better, 12% of respondents said it had gotten somewhat worse, and nobody said it got much worse. This year three respondents (3%) said it had gotten much worse, but only one said it had gotten somewhat worse. Overall, a plurality of people (44%) said it had gotten somewhat or much better. A larger number of respondents said crime had stayed about the same relative to last year's survey.

Survey respondents generally felt safe in the hot spots in most contexts, especially during the day where 73% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that they felt safe (Figure 10). The only context in which a majority of respondents did not feel safe was in the hot spots at night: 67% disagreed or strongly disagreed that they felt safe in this context. In terms of how often respondents reported seeing different indicators of disorder in the hot spots, drinking in public or seeing people drunk or high were the issues

Figure 9: Survey respondents' assessment of change in crime in the hot spots in the past year

Much worse
Somewhat worse
Stayed about the same
Somewhat better
Much better
Don't know
No response

most people reported seeing more frequently (Figure 11). Forty-seven percent of respondents reported seeing people drinking in public and 52% reported seeing people drunk or high a few times a week or every day. A substantial number of people said that they didn't know how frequently some issues, like people selling drugs or sex workers working on the street, occurred. Only 7 people said they saw sex workers a few times a week or every day.

Figure 10: Survey respondents' perceptions of safety in the hot spots

The results for respondents' perceptions of the likelihood that a serious crime might occur in the hot spots are more concerning that last year. In last year's survey, the majority of respondents reported that most serious crimes, such as shots fired, robberies, and thefts were unlikely or very unlikely. However, this year the results were the opposite. With the exception of sexual assault, the majority of respondents believed these serious crimes were likely or very likely at the hot spots. For example, 71% of respondents believed that it was likely or very likely that shots would be fired, and between 60% and 70% said the same for most other crime types. Fifty-eight percent of respondents said it was likely or very likely that

Figure 11: Survey respondents' perceptions of disorder frequency in the hot spots

theft from a person would occur, and 53% said it was likely or very likely that someone would break in to a property.

Figure 12: Survey respondents' perceptions of likelihood of serious crime in the hot spots

4.5 Community members report moderate levels of social cohesion and collective efficacy

Social cohesion refers to the extent to which residents of a community trust each other and feel they have the resources to take care of problems. We asked a number of questions on the survey that were designed to assess these issues. Overall, and consistent with prior surveys, respondents this year believed social cohesion was high (Figure 13), although the results were not as strong as prior years. Among those who answered the question, 34% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that residents knew each other by name and 47% agreed/strongly agreed that people would call the police if a crime was happening. Over 81% agreed or strongly agreed that residents cared about the community, 78% agreed or strongly agreed that business owners cared about the community, and 73% said people were willing to help each other out. A majority of people also said there were good activities for youth; property owners cared about the community; there are good stores, services, and opportunities to get involved; and people look out for each other and can be trusted. In general, respondents this year were fairly well-connected to the community themselves, although a little less so than last year (whch makes sense given the broader survey distribution this year). Just under half of respondents said they had attended a community meeting, while 62% said they had attended a social event and 61% had voluneered in the community. Just over a third of respondents had engaged in problem-solving with neighbors, which was lower than last year.

Figure 13: Survey respondents' perceptions of social cohesion in the hot spots

Perceptions of collective efficacy—the willingness of residents to intervene directly to address community problems, were less strong than perceived social cohesion. but still fairly promising (Figure 14). The results were relatively consistent with last year. A majority of respondents (52%) thought that residents would be willing to intervene if a fight happened, and close to half (44%) thought that people would intervene if people were spraying graffiti or vandalizing property, but most thought it was unlikely or very unlikely that someone would do something if young people were skipping school and hanging out on the street or showing disrespect to an adult.

Figure 14: Survey respondents' perceptions of collective efficacy in the hot spots

4.6 Perceptions of police were less favorable than in previous years

Perceptions of the police were less favorable than last year. Only 10% of respondents said they were very satisfied, compared with more than 30% of respondents last year. In all, 39% of respondents were some-what or very satisfied with the police. About 36% of the people who responded to the survey had contact with the police, but only one respondent had been arrested. Most people who had contact with the po-lice had reported a crime, been a victim or witness, and/or had spoken with an officer at a community meeting or event.

Figure 16 shows survey respondents' perceptions of police. The first two measures—"the police do a good job preventing crime" and "the police do a good job enforcing drug laws"—assess satisfaction with the police and the remaining three measures—the police treat people fairly, treat people with re-spect, and care about solving problems—assess perceived legitimacy. Figure 16 shows that satisfaction is somewhat lower than legitimacy. Only 25% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the police do a good job preventing crime, and 21% agreed or strongly agreed that they do a good job enforcing drug laws. Legitimacy measures were slightly higher: 35% agreed or strongly agreed that the police treat people fairly, 36% that the police treat people with respect, and 33% that the police care about solving problems.

5 Conclusions and Recommendations

ABSPY is a community-led, place-based, data-driven approach to reducing crime and public safety in five hot spots of juvenile and youth crime in the Rainier Beach neighborhood of Seattle. This updated evaluation report for 2022 shows some favorable results, especially for offenses involving youth—the key focus of the ABSPY initiative. Even though crime has ticked up overall in the past year, youth offenses

Figure 15: Survey respondents' perceptions of frequency of police activity in the hot spots

Figure 16: Survey respondents' perceptions of police in the hot spots

remain low and our survey results indicate that the community believes ABSPY makes the community safer.

- **There was an uptick in crime in 2022, but youth offenses remain low.** There were increases in overall crime and crime involving adults in most of the hot spots this year, but crimes involving youth generally remained low and, for the most part, the hot spots are less "hot" than they were pre-ABSPY implementation.

- **PBIS and business improvements are associated with lower rates of some offense types, even though they are higher in the hot spots overall.** When we examine statistical rather than descriptive differences in crime between the ABSPY hot spots and comparison sites outside Rainier Beach, we see that although rates of calls for service and crimes are generally higher in the Rainier Beach hot spots than the comparison sites, there are few significant differences between the two sites. Among the specific interventions, PBIS and business improvements are associated with significantly lower rates of some offenses. Specifically, business improvements are associated with lower rates of youth, violent, and Group A property offenses, and the Be[3] (PBIS) interventions were associated with lower rates of violent and Group B offenses. Importantly, we see these differences even though the outcomes were still higher in the treatment sites during overall ABSPY implementation. The COVID-19-related school closures were also associated with significant reductions in youth offenses, regardless of ABSPY effects.

- **Community members generally think ABSPY makes Rainier Beach safer.** Although fewer respondents this year said they had noticed the ABSPY interventions, this result may be because we reached a broader sample of respondents rather than simply reaching out via the mailing lists of ABSPY-affiliated organizations. Nonetheless, a majority of respondents were familiar with the Be[3] and many other were aware of the other interventions. Most respondents who had noticed the interventions felt that the interventions made the community safer, and very few if any felt that they made the community less safe.

- **Most people think crime has at least stayed the same, if not gotten better, in Rainier Beach in the past year, but there are concerns about serious crime.** Fewer respondents than last year said that crime had gotten worse in the hot spots in the past year. Most said that it had stayed the same or gotten somewhat better. In general, survey respondents felt safe in the hot spots in most contexts, except while walking around at night. In terms of disorder, respondents reported seeing people drinking in public or acting drunk and high most often. However, with the exception of sexual assault, respondents were much more likely than respondents last year to believe that a serious crime was likely to occur in the hot spots.

- **Community members report moderate levels of social cohesion and collective efficacy.** Survey respondents reported slightly lower levels of social cohesion than in previous years, but levels were still high. In particular, over 80% said residents cared about the community, and around three-quarters said that business owners cared about the community and that people were willing to help each other out. As in previous surveys, perceptions of collective efficacy were less strong. A majority of respondents thought that residents would be willing to intervene if a fight happened and close to half said that people would intervene if someone was spraying graffiti or vandalizing property, but they believed this was less likely in the event of kids skipping school or showing disrespect to an adult. A majority of respondents had attended a community social event or volunteered in the community, but fewer had engaged in problem-solving with neighbors compared with prior years.

- **Perceptions of police were less favorable than in previous years.** Compared with prior years, far fewer respondents said they were satisfied with police. Only 39% of respondents were somewhat or very satisfied with police. Respondents also reported seeing very little police activity in the neighborhood—most had seen people driving around, but few had seen police engaging with the community or even walking or cycling in the neighborhood. Only around one-quarter of respondents were satisfied with the police and about one-third reported higher levels of police legiti-

macy (e.g. perceiving that the police treat people fairly or with respect and cared about solving problems).

5.1 Recommendations for 2023

- **Develop a concrete action plan for ABSPY sustainability and development.** This recommendation is continued from last year's report. The mission and role of ABSPY and whether/how its members should be involved in citywide initiatives have been key topics of conversation in both 2021 and 2022. There have been several discussions about how to engage key city partners and leadership. In 2023 the Core Team should take concrete steps to determine which city leaders to collaborate with and whether to engage in consulting or collaboration with teams doing similar work in other places to raise the profile of the initiative both locally and nationally. Increasing visibility will also help the Core Team identify and explore opportunities for increased funding.

- **Continue exploring how to re-engage the community and increase representation, particularly among youth.** This recommendation is continued from our past three reports. There remains a clear desire and need among the Core Team to increase the representation of community members, especially young people, in this work, including data collection and analysis, to make it truly community-led. Several good ideas around youth engagement were proposed in 2022, and there was a robust discussion about whether to involve young people in the Core Team process directly or through engagement with youth representatives or 'ambassadors.' The Core Team should take concrete steps in 2023 to determine what youth involvement looks like and ensure that youth voices are represented.

- **Explore and rethink options for data collection and analysis.** The CEBCP stepped down as the research partner at the end of 2022, providing ABSPY with an opportunity to engage with a local partner who can better serve the needs of the team by being 'on the ground' more frequently. While the new research partner has not yet been selected, this process offers the Core Team a chance to consider what has worked well with existing data collection efforts and what could be improved. For example, is there an interest in more qualitative or observational data collection? Should crime outcomes still be the main metric of success, or as the initiative evolves will other members of community and youth engagement become more salient? These are important conversations for the Core Team to engage in with each other and with potential new research partners in 2023.

- **Re-engage with Lake Washington Apartments.** While almost all of the hot spots saw an uptick in crime in 2022, the Lake Washington hot spot, which includes Lake Washington Apartments as well as the segments of Seward Park Avenue S. that run alongside Beer Sheva Park and Rainier Beach High School, had the largest increase (albeit mainly among adults). Throughout the year, Core Team members noted that it had been challenging to engage with the apartment management team due to staffing issues and turnover. This area should be a priority for re-engagement and intervention in 2023 to ensure that crime does not continue to increase. Note that earlier in the ABSPY initiative (around 2016) there was also an uptick in both youth and adult crime at this location, which was reversed by increased collaboration at the site in the following year.

- **Consider whether to re-engage the Seattle Police Department.** In our 2021 report we recommended re-engaging with the Seattle Police Department, since ABPSY is primarily a public safety

and crime prevention initiative. Recent discussions among the Core Team members have high-lighted that there is not universal support for this on the team. While there is a recognition that ABSPY relies on SPD data, concerns have also been raised about past representation on the Core Team and who from SPD could be an appropriate replacement. Given this uncertainty, and the possibility of prioritizing different outcome measures for the initiative, the Core Team should consider whether to pursue conversations with SPD in 2023 and weigh up the relative benefits and costs of doing so.

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A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth

2022 Evaluation Update

Statistical Appendix

Table A1: Random effects negative binomial regression on calls for service

	ABSPY only	Full model
Fixed effects	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Post	.941 (.048)	.857* (.064)
ABSPY	1.392** (.177)	1.426** (.185)
Post × ABSPY	1.061 (.050)	1.212* (.105)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)		
Rose St	1.180 (.227)	1.146 (.230)
Light Rail	1.037 (.212)	.950 (.197)
Lake Washington	.987 (.195)	.904 (.184)
Safeway	.779 (.133)	.719 (.126)
Month (ref:Jan)		
Feb	.997 (.055)	1.000 (.055)
Mar	1.145* (.061)	1.145* (.061)
Apr	1.070 (.057)	1.058 (.055)
May	1.213*** (.062)	1.210*** (.062)
Jun	.946 (.051)	.950 (.052)
Jul	1.063 (.055)	1.064 (.056)
Aug	.956 (.050)	.958 (.051)
Sep	.932 (.050)	.938 (.050)
Oct	.960 (.051)	.963 (.051)
Nov	.927 (.050)	.930 (.050)
Dec	.889* (.048)	.890* (.048)
COVID-19 pandemic active	1.008 (.057)	.988 (.060)
COVID-19 school closures active	1.006 (.048)	1.020 (.049)
Trend	.999 (.001)	.999 (.001)
Autocorrelation controls		
1 month	1.463*** (.043)	1.447*** (.042)
2 months	1.212*** (.037)	1.205*** (.036)
3 months	1.060 (.032)	1.054 (.030)
4 months	1.024 (.029)	-
Corner Greeters active	-	1.063 (.093)
Corner Greeters active × ABSPY	-	.913 (.093)
Safe Passage active	-	1.028 (.121)
Safe Passage active × ABSPY	-	.911 (.129)
Business improvements active	-	1.069 (.089)
Business improvements active × ABSPY	-	1.011 (.101)
CPTED active	-	.879 (.065)
CPTED active × ABSPY	-	.994 (.100)
PBIS active	-	1.061 (.120)
PBIS active × ABSPY	-	.880 (.119)
Constant	1.592** (.276)	1.925*** (.342)
Dispersion parameters		
ln_r	10.630 (5.581)	10.248 (5.285)
ln_s	14.417 (7.783)	13.483 (7.141)
Log likelihood	-4321.249	-4341.719
Wald χ^2	770.221***	806.805***
N	1400	1410

Random effects negative binomial regression
Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table A2: Random effects negative binomial regression on all offenses

	ABSPY only	Full model
	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Fixed effects		
Post	.915 (.065)	.876 (.087)
ABSPY	1.271 (.216)	1.247 (.214)
Post × ABSPY	1.056 (.070)	1.225 (.143)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)		
Rose St	.687 (.168)	.683 (.176)
Light Rail	.709 (.225)	.687 (.220)
Lake Washington	.691 (.183)	.683 (.187)
Safeway	.669 (.163)	.619 (.161)
Month (ref:Jan)		
Feb	1.022 (.080)	1.018 (.078)
Mar	1.153 (.088)	1.139 (.087)
Apr	1.092 (.084)	1.084 (.082)
May	1.289*** (.094)	1.304*** (.095)
Jun	1.075 (.081)	1.107 (.085)
Jul	1.223** (.090)	1.255** (.093)
Aug	1.094 (.082)	1.121 (.085)
Sep	1.065 (.080)	1.077 (.081)
Oct	1.093 (.082)	1.098 (.082)
Nov	1.054 (.080)	1.061 (.080)
Dec	1.076 (.081)	1.086 (.081)
COVID-19 pandemic active	.897 (.073)	.857 (.074)
COVID-19 school closures active	.874 (.063)	.884 (.064)
Trend	1.000 (.001)	1.001 (.001)
Autocorrelation controls		
1 month	1.192*** (.038)	1.175*** (.037)
2 months	1.220*** (.039)	1.207*** (.038)
3 months	1.092** (.034)	1.081* (.033)
4 months	1.018 (.031)	-
Corner Greeters active	-	.786* (.094)
Corner Greeters active × ABSPY	-	1.089 (.154)
Safe Passage active	-	1.131 (.182)
Safe Passage active × ABSPY	-	.909 (.179)
Business improvements active	-	1.461** (.171)
Business improvements active × ABSPY	-	.693* (.099)
CPTED active	-	.776* (.077)
CPTED active × ABSPY	-	1.163 (.162)
PBIS active	-	1.244 (.194)
PBIS active × ABSPY	-	.768 (.145)
Constant	3.901*** (.929)	4.581*** (1.124)
Dispersion parameters		
ln_r	16.373 (10.217)	16.803 (10.559)
ln_s	10.568 (6.768)	10.372 (6.688)
Log likelihood	-3296.443	-3307.398
Wald χ^2	278.927***	304.489***
N	1400	1410

Random effects negative binomial regression
Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table A3: Random effects negative binomial regression on offenses involving youth

	ABSPY only	Full model
Fixed effects	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Post	1.015 (.129)	.969 (.174)
ABSPY	1.284 (.237)	1.373* (.206)
Post × ABSPY	1.011 (.116)	1.259 (.260)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)		
Rose St	.506** (.128)	.586* (.136)
Light Rail	.295*** (.083)	.290*** (.067)
Lake Washington	.609 (.158)	.677 (.143)
Safeway	.616 (.155)	.735 (.185)
Month (ref:Jan)		
Feb	1.107 (.158)	1.116 (.159)
Mar	1.188 (.167)	1.165 (.164)
Apr	1.171 (.165)	1.206 (.165)
May	1.667*** (.215)	1.696*** (.221)
Jun	1.211 (.166)	1.269 (.177)
Jul	1.260 (.171)	1.329* (.184)
Aug	1.196 (.164)	1.262 (.175)
Sep	1.134 (.156)	1.163 (.160)
Oct	1.240 (.169)	1.259 (.172)
Nov	1.050 (.147)	1.070 (.150)
Dec	1.082 (.150)	1.113 (.155)
COVID-19 pandemic active	1.017 (.151)	1.051 (.165)
COVID-19 school closures active	.681** (.095)	.668** (.094)
Trend	.996* (.002)	.995* (.002)
Autocorrelation controls		
1 month	1.164** (.054)	1.142** (.053)
2 months	1.150** (.052)	1.136** (.051)
3 months	1.105* (.050)	1.096* (.049)
4 months	1.029 (.046)	-
Corner Greeters active	-	.481** (.110)
Corner Greeters active × ABSPY	-	1.816* (.475)
Safe Passage active	-	1.477 (.404)
Safe Passage active × ABSPY	-	.783 (.257)
Business improvements active	-	2.750*** (.627)
Business improvements active × ABSPY	-	.315*** (.087)
CPTED active	-	.964 (.175)
CPTED active × ABSPY	-	.859 (.214)
PBIS active	-	1.619 (.462)
PBIS active × ABSPY	-	.626 (.210)
Constant	2.311** (.620)	2.242** (.568)
Dispersion parameters		
ln_r	18.051 (11.115)	46.293 (42.300)
ln_s	13.541 (8.626)	35.549 (33.693)
Log likelihood	-2237.822	-2240.087
Wald χ^2	216.318***	280.645***
N	1400	1410

Random effects negative binomial regression
Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table A4: Random effects negative binomial regression on violent of-
fenses

	ABSPY only	Full model
Fixed effects	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Post	.805 (.106)	.660* (.123)
ABSPY	1.449 (.314)	1.433 (.314)
Post × ABSPY	.998 (.119)	1.267 (.277)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)		
Rose St	.785 (.231)	.804 (.253)
Light Rail	.475* (.150)	.441* (.147)
Lake Washington	.483* (.146)	.419** (.137)
Safeway	.772 (.228)	.591 (.187)
Month (ref:Jan)		
Feb	1.015 (.147)	.997 (.143)
Mar	1.306 (.180)	1.286 (.171)
Apr	1.162 (.164)	1.104 (.152)
May	1.411** (.189)	1.398* (.185)
Jun	1.218 (.167)	1.263 (.174)
Jul	1.303* (.176)	1.334* (.181)
Aug	1.266 (.171)	1.315* (.178)
Sep	1.296 (.174)	1.302* (.174)
Oct	1.130 (.156)	1.139 (.156)
Nov	1.179 (.161)	1.187 (.161)
Dec	1.188 (.162)	1.190 (.162)
COVID-19 pandemic active	.963 (.133)	.819 (.119)
COVID-19 school closures active	.914 (.105)	.957 (.110)
Trend	1.002 (.002)	1.006** (.002)
Autocorrelation controls		
1 month	1.193*** (.059)	1.143** (.055)
2 months	1.079 (.053)	1.065 (.051)
3 months	1.225*** (.060)	-
4 months	1.032 (.050)	-
Corner Greeters active	-	.623* (.147)
Corner Greeters active × ABSPY	-	1.438 (.396)
Safe Passage active	-	1.630 (.472)
Safe Passage active × ABSPY	-	.659 (.227)
Business improvements active	-	2.184*** (.517)
Business improvements active × ABSPY	-	.485* (.138)
CPTED active	-	.479*** (.084)
CPTED active × ABSPY	-	1.270 (.304)
PBIS active	-	1.080 (.297)
PBIS active × ABSPY	-	.514* (.168)
Constant	3.624*** (1.211)	5.399*** (1.964)
Dispersion parameters		
ln_r	50.816 (28.811)	57.882 (34.321)
ln_s	12.228 (6.616)	11.685 (6.595)
Log likelihood	-1979.917	-1993.580
Wald χ^2	81.204***	108.280***
N	1400	1420

Random effects negative binomial regression
Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table A5: Random effects negative binomial regression on Group A person offenses

	ABSPY only	Full model
Fixed effects	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Post	1.091 (.139)	1.070 (.183)
ABSPY	1.584 (.382)	1.523 (.350)
Post $\times$ ABSPY	.936 (.109)	.991 (.203)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)		
Rose St	.791 (.260)	.911 (.299)
Light Rail	.263*** (.092)	.269*** (.092)
Lake Washington	.495* (.171)	.562 (.195)
Safeway	.673 (.222)	.570 (.188)
Month (ref:Jan)		
Feb	.998 (.141)	.991 (.139)
Mar	1.189 (.158)	1.157 (.153)
Apr	1.128 (.151)	1.104 (.148)
May	1.412** (.181)	1.415** (.182)
Jun	1.249 (.165)	1.290 (.171)
Jul	1.314* (.170)	1.352* (.177)
Aug	1.278 (.167)	1.305* (.172)
Sep	1.264 (.165)	1.261 (.164)
Oct	1.169 (.155)	1.162 (.154)
Nov	1.109 (.149)	1.109 (.148)
Dec	1.127 (.151)	1.132 (.151)
COVID-19 pandemic active	1.083 (.145)	1.023 (.147)
COVID-19 school closures active	.889 (.099)	.908 (.102)
Trend	.999 (.002)	1.000 (.002)
Autocorrelation controls		
1 month	1.175*** (.056)	1.132** (.054)
2 months	1.088 (.052)	1.064 (.051)
Corner Greeters active	-	.575** (.121)
Corner Greeters active $\times$ ABSPY	-	1.476 (.370)
Safe Passage active	-	1.577 (.418)
Safe Passage active $\times$ ABSPY	-	.712 (.236)
Business improvements active	-	2.191*** (.483)
Business improvements active $\times$ ABSPY	-	.612 (.164)
CPTED active	-	.581** (.099)
CPTED active $\times$ ABSPY	-	1.189 (.274)
PBIS active	-	1.278 (.324)
PBIS active $\times$ ABSPY	-	.609 (.193)
Constant	4.814*** (1.606)	5.356*** (1.861)
Dispersion parameters		
ln_r	37.939 (20.957)	47.400 (27.642)
ln_s	9.217 (4.849)	10.518 (5.882)
Log likelihood	-2038.973	-2023.292
Wald χ^2	64.558***	100.587***
N	1420	1420

Random effects negative binomial regression
Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table A6: Random effects negative binomial regression on Group A property offenses

	ABSPY only	Full model
Fixed effects	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Post	.784** (.070)	.761* (.096)
ABSPY	1.193 (.282)	1.229 (.290)
Post × ABSPY	1.131 (.092)	1.302 (.195)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)		
Rose St	.418* (.166)	.407* (.167)
Light Rail	.634 (.283)	.612 (.273)
Lake Washington	.705 (.322)	.649 (.293)
Safeway	.389* (.149)	.370* (.151)
Month (ref:Jan)		
Feb	1.005 (.096)	1.002 (.096)
Mar	1.113 (.106)	1.112 (.106)
Apr	.975 (.093)	.982 (.094)
May	1.188 (.109)	1.206* (.112)
Jun	.971 (.092)	1.000 (.097)
Jul	1.172 (.108)	1.203* (.113)
Aug	1.059 (.099)	1.087 (.103)
Sep	1.063 (.099)	1.073 (.100)
Oct	1.142 (.104)	1.153 (.106)
Nov	1.060 (.098)	1.068 (.099)
Dec	1.052 (.097)	1.065 (.098)
COVID-19 pandemic active	.874 (.087)	.837 (.090)
COVID-19 school closures active	.876 (.077)	.888 (.079)
Trend	1.001 (.001)	1.002 (.002)
Autocorrelation controls		
1 month	1.218*** (.045)	1.211*** (.044)
2 months	1.136*** (.042)	1.130*** (.041)
3 months	1.091* (.039)	1.087* (.039)
Corner Greeters active	-	.794 (.123)
Corner Greeters active × ABSPY	-	1.060 (.193)
Safe Passage active	-	1.113 (.240)
Safe Passage active × ABSPY	-	.851 (.222)
Business improvements active	-	1.386* (.204)
Business improvements active × ABSPY	-	.699* (.127)
CPTED active	-	.844 (.106)
CPTED active × ABSPY	-	1.095 (.197)
PBIS active	-	1.079 (.227)
PBIS active × ABSPY	-	.985 (.246)
Constant	7.341*** (2.667)	7.551*** (2.812)
Dispersion parameters		
ln_r	10.476 (6.214)	11.380 (7.025)
ln_s	3.763 (2.294)	4.041 (2.574)
Log likelihood	-2693.962	-2688.589
Wald χ^2	146.858***	157.418***
N	1410	1410

Random effects negative binomial regression
Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table A7: Random effects negative binomial regression on Group B
offenses

	ABSPY only	Full model
Fixed effects	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Post	1.218 (.167)	1.145 (.216)
ABSPY	1.317 (.297)	1.356 (.328)
Post × ABSPY	1.025 (.134)	1.198 (.266)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)		
Rose St	.705 (.214)	.856 (.295)
Light Rail	.250*** (.084)	.263*** (.098)
Lake Washington	.535* (.169)	.599 (.217)
Safeway	.811 (.242)	.741 (.249)
Month (ref:Jan)		
Feb	1.001 (.153)	1.007 (.154)
Mar	1.097 (.165)	1.093 (.160)
Apr	1.176 (.174)	1.188 (.172)
May	1.397* (.198)	1.334* (.188)
Jun	1.122 (.162)	1.103 (.163)
Jul	1.272 (.179)	1.268 (.183)
Aug	1.021 (.150)	1.041 (.155)
Sep	.921 (.139)	.939 (.142)
Oct	.947 (.143)	.963 (.146)
Nov	.965 (.146)	.976 (.148)
Dec	1.077 (.160)	1.068 (.159)
COVID-19 pandemic active	.631* (.115)	.593** (.112)
COVID-19 school closures active	.821 (.150)	.815 (.150)
Trend	.996* (.002)	.994* (.002)
Autocorrelation controls		
1 month	1.241*** (.068)	1.223*** (.066)
2 months)	1.095 (.060)	1.103 (.059)
3 months)	1.149* (.063)	-
4 months	1.172** (.064)	-
5 months	.974 (.052)	-
Corner Greeters active	-	.941 (.209)
Corner Greeters active × ABSPY	-	1.112 (.292)
Safe Passage active	-	1.152 (.331)
Safe Passage active × ABSPY	-	.964 (.342)
Business improvements active	-	1.549* (.342)
Business improvements active × ABSPY	-	.698 (.185)
CPTED active	-	.648* (.127)
CPTED active × ABSPY	-	1.254 (.345)
PBIS active	-	1.699 (.468)
PBIS active × ABSPY	-	.503* (.171)
Constant	3.468*** (1.115)	4.296*** (1.465)
Dispersion parameters		
ln_r	38.835 (22.500)	30.516 (17.824)
ln_s	11.117 (6.271)	8.559 (4.875)
Log likelihood	-1733.697	-1783.468
Wald χ^2	239.228***	234.682***
N	1390	1420

Random effects negative binomial regression
Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure A1: Percent change in calls for service in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014

### Neighborhood-level change in calls for service

Figure A2: Percent change in offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014

Neighborhood-level change in all offenses

Figure A3: Percent change in youth offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014

Neighborhood-level change in offenses involving youth

Hot spots
Rest of Rainier Beach
Comparison spots
Rest of South Precinct

-36
-35
-31
-27

-40   -30   -20   -10   0

Percent change

Figure A4: Percent change in violent offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014

Neighborhood-level change in violent offenses

Hot spots
Rest of Rainier Beach
Comparison spots
Rest of South Precinct

-14
-19
-16
-8

-20   -15   -10   -5   0

Percent change

Figure A5: Percent change in NIBRS Group A Person offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South
Precinct, pre/post May 2014

### Neighborhood-level change in Group A person offenses

Legend:
- ■ Hot spots (orange)
- ■ Comparison spots (dark blue)
- ■ Rest of Rainier Beach (medium blue)
- ■ Rest of South Precinct (light blue)

Bar values:
- Hot spots: -9
- Comparison spots: -3
- Rest of Rainier Beach: (small, near 0)
- Rest of South Precinct: -3

X-axis: Percent change, from -8 to 0

Figure A6: Percent change in NIBRS Group A Property offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South
Precinct, pre/post May 2014

Neighborhood-level change in Group A property offenses

Legend:
- ■ Hot spots (orange)
- ■ Comparison spots (dark blue)
- ■ Rest of Rainier Beach (medium blue)
- ■ Rest of South Precinct (light blue)

Bar values:
- Hot spots: -12
- Comparison spots: -25
- Rest of Rainier Beach: -15
- Rest of South Precinct: -2

X-axis: Percent change, from -25 to 0

Figure A7: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014

Neighborhood-level change in Group B offenses

Figure A8: Percent change in calls for service at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in calls for service, Rose St

Figure A9: Percent change in all offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in all offenses, Rose St

Figure A10: Percent change in youth offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in youth offenses, Rose St

Figure A11: Percent change in violent offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in selected violent offenses, Rose St

Figure A12: Percent change in NIBRS Group A person offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Group A person offenses, Rose St

Figure A13: Percent change in NIBRS Group A property offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Group A property offenses, Rose St

Figure A14: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Group B offenses, Rose St

Figure A15: Percent change in calls for service at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

### Change in calls for service, Rainier & Henderson

Figure A16: Percent change in all offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

### Change in all offenses, Rainier & Henderson

Figure A17: Percent change in youth offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in youth offenses, Rainier & Henderson

Figure A18: Percent change in violent offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

### Change in selected violent offenses, Rainier & Henderson

Figure A19: Percent change in NIBRS Group A person offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

### Change in NIBRS Group A person offenses, Rainier & Henderson

Figure A20: Percent change in NIBRS Group A property offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

### Change in NIBRS Group A property offenses, Rainier & Henderson

Figure A21: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Group B offenses, Rainier & Henderson

Figure A22: Percent change in calls for service at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in calls for service, Light Rail

Figure A23: Percent change in all offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in all offenses, Light Rail

■ Light Rail　　■ Light Rail Comparison

-40

-22

-40　　-30　　-20　　-10　　0

Percent change

Figure A24: Percent change in youth offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in youth offenses, Light Rail

■ Light Rail　　■ Light Rail Comparison

-38

-16

-40　　-30　　-20　　-10　　0

Percent change

Figure A25: Percent change in violent offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in selected violent offenses, Light Rail

■ Light Rail   ■ Light Rail Comparison

Percent change

Figure A26: Percent change in NIBRS Group A person offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Group A person offenses, Light Rail

■ Light Rail   ■ Light Rail Comparison

Percent change

Figure A27: Percent change in NIBRS Group A property offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

### Change in NIBRS Group A property offenses, Light Rail

Figure A28: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Group B offenses, Light Rail

Figure A29: Percent change in calls for service at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

### Change in calls for service, Lake Washington

■ Lake Washington   ■ Lake Washington Comparison

Figure A30: Percent change in all offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in all offenses, Lake Washington

■ Lake Washington   ■ Lake Washington Comparison

Figure A31: Percent change in youth offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in youth offenses, Lake Washington

Figure A32: Percent change in violent offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in selected violent offenses, Lake Washington

Figure A33: Percent change in NIBRS Group A person offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Group A person offenses, Lake Washington

Figure A34: Percent change in NIBRS Group A property offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Group A property offenses, Lake Washington

Figure A35: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Group B offenses, Lake Washington

Figure A36: Percent change in calls for service at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in calls for service, Safeway

Figure A37: Percent change in all offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in all offenses, Safeway

Figure A38: Percent change in youth offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in youth offenses, Safeway

■ Safeway ■ Safeway Comparison

-44

-30

Percent change

Figure A39: Percent change in violent offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in selected violent offenses, Safeway

■ Safeway ■ Safeway Comparison

74

44

Percent change

Figure A40: Percent change in NIBRS Group A person offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Group A person offenses, Safeway

Figure A41: Percent change in NIBRS Group A property offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Group A property offenses, Safeway

Figure A42: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Group B offenses, Safeway

Figure A43: Calls for service in treatment and comparison sites, 2011-2022

Calls for service, 2011-2022

1: CTF training, community center reopens
2: Corner Greeters and plaza activation begin
3: Corner Greeters and plaza activation end
4: Safe Passage begins
5: Corner Greeters resume, business engagement begins
6: Break in interventions (except Safe Passage)
7: Corner Greeters and business engagement resume
8: CPTED begins
9: PBIS begins
10: Break in business engagement
11: Business engagement resumes
12: COVID-19 pandemic
13: Schools fully reopen

Figure A44: Predicted number of calls by treatment assignment and intervention status

Calls for service

Figure A45: Offenses in treatment and comparison sites, 2011-2022

All offenses, 2011-2022

1: CTF training, community center reopens
2: Corner Greeters and plaza activation begin
3: Corner Greeters and plaza activation end
4: Safe Passage begins
5: Corner Greeters resume, business engagement begins
6: Break in interventions (except Safe Passage)
7: Corner Greeters and business engagement resume
8: CPTED begins
9: PBIS begins
10: Break in business engagement
11: Business engagement resumes
12: COVID-19 pandemic
13: Schools fully reopen

Figure A46: Predicted number of offenses by treatment assignment and intervention status

All offenses

Figure A47: Youth offenses in treatment and comparison sites, 2011-2022

Offenses involving youth (suspect or victim), 2011-2022

— Treatment hot spots — Comparison hot spots

1: CTF training, community center reopens
2: Corner Greeters and plaza activation begin
3: Corner Greeters and plaza activation end
4: Safe Passage begins
5: Corner Greeters resume, business engagement begins
6: Break in interventions (except Safe Passage)
7: Corner Greeters and business engagement resume
8: CPTED begins
9: PBIS begins
10: Break in business engagement
11: Business engagement resumes
12: COVID-19 pandemic
13: Schools fully reopen

Figure A48: Predicted number of youth offenses by treatment assignment and intervention status

Offenses involving youth (suspect/victim)

Pre- or post-ABSPY start (May 2014)

—●— Comparison   —●— ABSPY

Figure A49: Violent offenses in treatment and comparison sites, 2011-2022

Selected violent offenses, 2011-2022

— Treatment hot spots   — Comparison hot spots

1: CTF training, community center reopens
2: Corner Greeters and plaza activation begin
3: Corner Greeters and plaza activation end
4: Safe Passage begins
5: Corner Greeters resume, business engagement begins
6: Break in interventions (except Safe Passage)
7: Corner Greeters and business engagement resume
8: CPTED begins
9: PBIS begins
10: Break in business engagement
11: Business engagement resumes
12: COVID-19 pandemic
13: Schools fully reopen

Figure A50: Predicted number of violent offenses by treatment assignment and intervention status

Violent offenses

Pre- or post-ABSPY start (May 2014)

—●— Comparison   —●— ABSPY

Figure A51: NIBRS Group A person offenses in treatment and comparison sites, 2011-2022

NIBRS Group A person offenses, 2011-2022

1: CTF training, community center reopens
2: Corner Greeters and plaza activation begin
3: Corner Greeters and plaza activation end
4: Safe Passage begins
5: Corner Greeters resume, business engagement begins
6: Break in interventions (except Safe Passage)
7: Corner Greeters and business engagement resume
8: CPTED begins
9: PBIS begins
10: Break in business engagement
11: Business engagement resumes
12: COVID-19 pandemic
13: Schools fully reopen

Figure A52: Predicted number of NIBRS Group A person offenses by treatment assignment and intervention status

NIBRS Group A Person offenses

Figure A53: NIBRS Group A property offenses in treatment and comparison sites, 2011-2022

NIBRS Group A property offenses, 2011-2022

1: CTF training, community center reopens
2: Corner Greeters and plaza activation begin
3: Corner Greeters and plaza activation end
4: Safe Passage begins
5: Corner Greeters resume, business engagement begins
6: Break in interventions (except Safe Passage)
7: Corner Greeters and business engagement resume
8: CPTED begins
9: PBIS begins
10: Break in business engagement
11: Business engagement resumes
12: COVID-19 pandemic
13: Schools fully reopen

Figure A54: Predicted number of NIBRS Group A property offenses by treatment assignment and intervention status

NIBRS Group A Property offenses

Figure A55: NIBRS Group B offenses in treatment and comparison sites, 2011-2022

NIBRS Group B offenses, 2011-2022

— Treatment hot spots   — Comparison hot spots

1: CTF training, community center reopens
2: Corner Greeters and plaza activation begin
3: Corner Greeters and plaza activation end
4: Safe Passage begins
5: Corner Greeters resume, business engagement begins
6: Break in interventions (except Safe Passage)
7: Corner Greeters and business engagement resume
8: CPTED begins
9: PBIS begins
10: Break in business engagement
11: Business engagement resumes
12: COVID-19 pandemic
13: Schools fully reopen

Figure A56: Predicted number of NIBRS Group B offenses by treatment assignment and intervention status

NIBRS Group B offenses

Pre- or post-ABSPY start (May 2014)

Comparison   ABSPY